University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1959

The Supreme Court and Its Judicial Critics
Philip B. Kurland

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Philip B. Kurland, "The Supreme Court and Its Judicial Critics," 6 Utah Law Review 457 (1959).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

UTAH
Vol. 6

LAW

REVIEW

FALL, 1959

No. 4

THE SUPREME COURT AND
ITS JUDICIAL CRITICSt
By PHILIP B. KURLAND*
In August, 1958, the Conference of Chief Justices, by a vote of 36 to 8,
admonished the Supreme Court of the United States to "exercise one of the
greatest of all judicial powers - the power of judicial restraint.. .." - Thereupon, fame or infamy, depending on your point of view, descended suddenly
upon a body of jurists whose previous existence and actions had been about as
well known as was the work of the Manhattan Project during the Second
World War. In part the publicity resulted from the fact that the pronouncement of the Conference coincided with the announcement of the special session of the Supreme Court to review the unlawful and seditious actions of the

Governor of Arkansas in the Little Rock crisis. It is not irrelevant, therefore,
to point out at the outset that there is not one iota of criticism in the Conference's Resolution or Report 2 which is directed to the School SegregationCases.3
In fact the Conference's documents were rather restrained complaints about
the Supreme Court's "activism" which the Chief Justices believed to call for
self-correction.
At a time when Congress was plagued with bills to restrict the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in matters relating to the States - one of which failed
of passage by a single vote - the Conference of Chief Justices' Report began
with the following statement:
...when we turn to the specific field of the effect of judicial decisions on
federal-state relationships, we come at once to the question as 'to where
power should lie to give the ultimate interpretation -tothe Constitution and
to the law made in pursuance thereof under the authority of the United
States. By necessity and by almost common consent, these ultimate powers
are regarded as being vested in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Any other allocation of such power would seem to lead to chaos....
The demand for judicial restraint by the Conference was not novel 4 nor
were theirs the only judicial voices to make the same plaint. Only a few
months beforethe Report, a similar cri de coeur, if in more subtle, sophisticated,
t Speech delivered before the Utah Bar Association in Salt Lake City on May 15, 1959.
Professor of Law, The Law School, The University of Chicago.
Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution on Federal-State Relationships as Affected by
Judicial Decisions (August 23, 1958) (hereinafter cited as "Resolution").
' See Conference of Chief Justices, Report of Commitee on Federal-State Relationships
as Affected by Judicial Decisions (August, 1958) (hereinafter cited as "Report"). Both the
Resolution and an uncorrected copy of the Report are reproduced in U.S. News and World
Report 92-102 (October 3, 1958).
'Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
' For an excellent historical treatment, see McGowan, The Supreme Court in the American Constitutional System--The Problem in HistoricalPerspective, 33 NoRE DAME LAW 527
(1958).
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and elegant tones, issued from the throat of Judge Learned Hand as he delivered the Oliver Wendell Holmes' Lectures at Harvard. 5 (Parenthetically
it should be noted that Judge Hand expressed serious doubts about the Segregation Cases," as did Professor Wechsler in his more recent Holmes Lecture.) 7
Mr. Justice Jackson's 1955 Godkin Lectures s recognized that the Court continued to exercise its powers in the very same way that had brought forth Mr.
Justice Stone's demands for judicial restraint 9 on the part of the Nine Old Men,
a generation before. And much of what is to be found in the Report of the
Conference of Chief Justices is documented by Mr. Justice Roberts' Holmes'
Lectures of 1951.10 Indeed, the charges leveled by the Chief Justices were well
grounded in opinions by Justices of the Court themselves.
Despite its lack of novelty, however, criticism of the judicial critics was
widespread. It took many forms. At least one thin-skinned member of the
Supreme Court treated the action of the Conference as a personal attack, a
crime in the nature of lse-majest& Officers of the executive branch of the
Government behaved in the same way. So-called "liberals" - so well described by William S. White in his Harper article entitled "The Washington
Phonies" 11 - were aghast at the effrontery of any challenge to the work of the
liberal clique of the Court. The more reasoned criticism, such as that of Dean
Griswold 12 and Professor Freund," took issue with the Chief Justices' Report
on the merits. Their view was that the Chief Justices had criticized the Court
for the wrong reasons. Each delivered a bill of particulars in support of his
own indictment.
Much doubt was also expressed about the propriety of the Conference
speaking in a corporative capacity. It was not the first time it had done so. And
its previous effort secured Supreme Court recognition. 4 But perhaps the most
telling attack on the Report can be summarized in a variety of ways. The language of equity would refer to clean hands; laymen might talk about people
in glass houses; ministers would speak of casting the first stone; and, in the
vernacular of children, it would be: "You're one, too!" But this is less of a
defense of the Supreme Court against the demands of the Conference than it
is a plea of confession and avoidance. And in the forum of public opinion,
the wrongs of the Supreme Court cannot be deemed expiated by the equal or
grosser errors on the part of the courts over which the Chief Justices of the
States preside.
'Hand, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
'Id. at 54-55.
'Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAsv. L. REv. 1, 34
(1959). "For me, the question posed by state enforced segregation is not one of discrimination at all. Its human and its constitutional dimension lies entirely elsewhere, in the denial
by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges equally on any groups or races
that may be involved."
'Jackson, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 79 (1955).
'See, e.g., Stone, J., dissenting, in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936).

"Roberts,

THE COURT AND THE

CoNSTrrrrION (1951).

"217 Harper's 79, 81 (October, 1958).
Griswold, Morrison Lecture, 43 MAss. L.Q. 98 (1958).
"Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, 3 N.Y. STATE BAR BULL. 66 (Feb. 1959)
"See Jackson, J., concurring, in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 538-39 (1953).
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The fact of the matter is that if there is any reason to challenge the action
of the Chief Justices, it is on the ground that it gave aid and comfort to the
enemy: to those doing battle against the Constitutional "concept of ordered
liberty." It was the warm greetings of brotherhood from the Southern demagogues and the paeans of praise from the American witch-hunting fraternity
that did the harm.
I submit, however, that we are in a most unfortunate situation if silence is
to be enjoined upon those who would criticize the Court lest their words be
misused by those who are threatening to undermine our institutions. For we
have it on the highest authority that criticism of the Supreme Court's work
is essential to the Court's function; that it should not be dispensed with either
because it would offend those whom we like or please those whom we dislike.
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, echoing the views of Justices Brewer' s and
17
Holmes,6 among others, expressed himself in this language: '
I have no patience with the complaint that criticism of judicial action
involves any lack of respect for the courts. When -the courts deal, as ours
do with great public questions, the only protection against unwise decisions,
and even judicial usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their actions and fearless comment upon it.

And Justices Frankfurter' and Harlan 19 have recently expressed similar sentiments. The only appropriate limitation on the critics of the Court is that the
20
criticism should be responsible. Judge Learned Hand phrased it this way:
While it is proper that people should find fault when their judges fail,
it is only reasonable that they should recognize the difficulties.... Let them
" "It is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or helped by being
spoken of as beyond criticism. On the contrary, the life and character of the justices
should be the subject of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments subject to the
freest criticism. The time is past in the history of the world when any living man or
body of men can be set on a pedestal and decorated with a halo. True, many criticisms
may be, like their authors, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than
no criticism at all. The moving waters are full of life and health; only in the still
waters is stagnation and death."
Brewer, Government by Injunction, 15 NAT. CORP. REP. 848, 849 (1898).
" Of Holmes it was aptly said that "his humility was too deep to make him regard even
the highest tribunal as a Grand Lama. Like all human institutions, the Supreme Court, he
believed, must earn reverence through the test of truth." Frankfurter, MR. JuSTIcE HOLMES
AND THE SUPREME COURT 93-94 (1938).
"Quoted in Schwartz, THE SUPREME COURT at v (1957).
""Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from
criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders of judicial office
are identified with the interests of justice they may forget their common human frailities
and fallibilities. There have sometimes been martinets upon the bench as there have
also been pompous wielders of authority who have used their paraphernalia of power
in support of what they call their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of
their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of
criticism expressed with candor however blunt."
Quoted in 3 WISDOM 24 (January, 1959).
""The Supreme Court, no less than the top echelons of the other two great branches of
the Federal Government, should never be immune from criticism.... Dispassioned criticism
of the Court's decisions is something to be welcomed, and if in order to preserve that healthy
state of affairs the Court must also suffer unjust attacks it is a price that must be paid." Harlan, Some Fiftieth Anniversary Remarks delivered at the fiftieth anniversary dinner of the
New York County Lawyers' Association. 16 BAR BULLETIN, Naw YORK CouNTY LAW. Ass'N.
204, 207 (1959).
'Hand, How Far Is A Judge Free in Rendering A Decision? (1933), in THE SPMrr OF
LIERTY 103, 110 (2d Dilliard ed., 1953).
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be severely brought to book, when they go wrong, but by those who will
take the trouble to understand them.
The problem, however, is this. The Court's responsible critics can only
address themselves to each other or to an audience which does not understand
the role and function of the Supreme Court of the United States. The result
is that however valid or justifiable the criticism, it tends to fall on ears that
are deaf to the bases of the criticisms and hear only the condemnation of the
Court. In short, the problem is that the Supreme Court is probably the least
understood of all our important American institutions and responsible criticism cannot be brought home to the appropriate audiences. And there are
many causes for this lack of understanding, some of which I should like to
speak to here, for implicit in the causes are to be found the bases for cure.
1. The Bar. Because my audience today is what is is, I list the deficiencies
of the Bar first among the factors contributing to the lack of understanding
of the Supreme Court. It would seem to me obvious that the Bar is the natural
intermediary between the people and the Court, interpreting the Court to the
people and the people to the Court. The fact is that few members of the Bar
are any more familiar with the work of the Supreme Court than are other semieducated people in the community. Possibly many can name all nine justices,
but usually it goes little beyond that. The Supreme Court's business does not
involve bread and butter matters for most of us. A few specialists will read
the decisions of the Court which are published in the loose-leaf services which
they read so religiously. But on the whole lawyers are more dedicated to reading the comic strips than the Supreme Court reports. And yet lawyers are
relatively influential people in their communities. 21 Their views on Supreme
Court matters would be welcomed, if they represented a study of greater depth
than that which is available in the newspapers. "The layman may think that
the law is clear and simple, and well known to those who have had legal training. The lawyer knows that the law in hard cases is wrought out of contemplation and understanding, and is only obtained after intellectual work of the
most difficult and searching kind." 22 And it is his obligation to communicate
that understanding.
Mr. Justice Harlan recently said to the New York County Lawyers' Association:

23

It would be a fine thing, in my opinion, were a bar association like yours
to establish a special committee of qualified lawyers whose duty it would
be to follow regularly the decisions of the Supreme Court, and to issue to
the press from time to time brief, simply written, and objective accounts of
those decisions likely to make "headline" news. Such authoritative accounts would do a great deal towards preventing irresponsible abuse of the
Court's decisions on the part of those who are displeased with them or
have special axes to grind.
I would concur in these views, but I think that there is a more fundamental
duty to be performed. Either before or at least concurrently with its under2

See Packard, Tiie STATUS SEEKERS 109 (1959).

Griswold, op. cit. supra note 12 at 108.
Harlan, op. cit. supra note 19 at 206.
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taking by committee to keep the public informed about the Court's business,
I think it incumbent on the Bar to undertake to educate itself on the subject
-and
not by committee. A committee of readers is not the answer to this
problem, any more than a committee is normally the answer to any real problem.
Every time I hear a suggestion that a committee be established I am reminded of two Churchillian comments. "I should deprecate setting up a special committee," he once wrote. "We are overrun by them like the Australians
were by the rabbits." 24 He commented again on the ineffectiveness of committees as they work on "those broad, happy uplands where everything is
settled for the greatest good of the greatest number by the common sense of
the most after the consultation of all." He concluded that important business
could not be conducted by "a copious flow of polite conversation." 25 In this
vein, I should like to suggest that the problem of which I have spoken requires
individual effort - a do it yourself program.
2. The Press. The second major barrier to the understanding of the Court
is the daily and weekly American press. With the single exception of the work
of Anthony Lewis of The New York Times, the most appropriate adjective I
can propose for the press coverage of the Supreme Court is "abominable."
Were I not fairly sure that the cause is ineptitude, I should suspect malevolence.
Let me say quickly that I am not scoring the press for being critical of the
Court. Criticism, as I have already noted, is essential to the Court's proper
function. But it must be informed criticism. And this the press has not made
available. For the most part, the press has treated Supreme Court opinions as
if they were government news releases. Most Supreme Court cases are not
deemed newsworthy in the pages now so crowded with stories of rapes and
auto accidents and ribbon-cutting ceremonies and comic strips and cooking
recipes. And those cases which do receive attention in the press are treated
in the same manner as political issues involving Congress or the Executive. The
complexes of fact and law which distinguish one case from another, which
call forth different emphases and different solutions are ignored. The headlines shout COMMUNIST FREED BY SUPREME COURT; the news stories
have no more content than the headlines; and editorial comment tends to be
based on the inadequate news stories.
Perhaps it is naive of me to believe that there is a difference between a news
story and an editorial. And my naivete extends to the belief that the primary
element of a news story is accuracy. But I would remind the American press
of Professor Hocking's justification for its existence: "The press must be free
because its freedom is a condition of its veracity." 26 Freedom of the press is
not an end in itself. It is a fundamental liberty because it is a means of keeping
the people informed of the truth. I would go so far as to suggest that its obligation is to tell the people the whole truth and nothing but the truth; that it must
justify its freedom by its responsibility. And I will not be put off by the suggestion that the task of accurate and reasonably complete reporting of the business
"Quoted in Wheare,
Id. at 252.
' Hocking, FREEDOM

GOVERNMENT BY COMMITTEE 1

OF THE PRESS 194

(1955).

(1947).
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of the Court is not possible. The New York Times does it and The Times of
London demonstrates that the New York paper is not unique in its capacity to
report on judicial business. Without it the Supreme Court is not likely to be
understood as it should be understood if our free institutions are to function
properly.
3. Congress. A third impediment to the understanding of the Court in its
actual or ideal role is Congress. In its official capacity, Congress speaks with
but a single voice: through the legislation which it enacts. But unofficially it
speaks through as many voices as there are Senators and Congressmen. So far
as the Court is concerned, Congress has frequently been irresponsible in its
utilization of its single voice and its many voices.
Let me speak first to the problem of the Court and the many voiced Congress. One of the primary duties of the Court is to interpret and apply the
language which Congress has utilized in framing its laws. The statutes, as we
know, are often the result of compromise on the part of the interested legislators and ignorance on the part of most of those who have merely followed their
party leader's orders. The problem of statutory construction is ordinarily difficult enough whenever the meaning is sufficiently beclouded to result in litigation. And a case finds its way to the Supreme Court only in the more impor27
tant and frequently in the most delicate matters.
No sooner has the Court performed the difficult task of interpreting the
meaning of Congressional language, however, than one or more of Congress'
several voices will be heard to damn the Court for having misconstrued the
statute. These are often isolated voices, but the press finds them newsworthy
and it magnifies them. The fact is, of course, that if the dissatisfaction with
the judicial construction were widespread in Congress, it could, speaking
through its single voice amend the statute to conform with its desires. Seldom
has this occurred in comparison with the number of times that the brass has
been sounded.2 8 Congressmen prefer condemning the Court in public orations
to taking constructive effort to remedy what they consider to be the Court's
errors. The Congressional furor which followed the decision in Pennsylvania
-' The difficulty of the task is attested by no less a figure in the American judiciary than
fudge Learned Hand:
"What then are the qualities, mental and moral, which best serve a judge to discharge
this perilous but inescapable duty? First he must be aware of the difficulty and the
hazard. He must hesitate long before imputing more to the 'enactment' than he finds in
the words, remembering that the 'policy' of any law may inhere as much in its limits
as in its extent. He must hesitate long before cutting down their literal effect, remembering that the authors presumably said no more than they wanted. He must have the
historical capacity to reconstruct the whole setting which evoked the law; the contentions
which it resolved; the objects which it sought; the events which led up to it. But all this
is only the beginning, for he must possess the far more exceptional power of divination
which can peer into the purpose beyond its expression, and bring to fruition that which
lay only in flower. Of the moral qualities necessary to this, before and beyond all he
must purge his mind and will of those personal presuppositions and prejudices which
almost inevitably invade all human judgments; he must approach his problems with
as little preconception of what should be the outcome as it is given to men to have; in
short, the prime condition of his success will be his capacity for detachment."
Hand, THE SPRIr OF LIBERTY 209, 217-218 (2d Dilliard ed., 1953); cf. Frankfurter, SoxiE REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES

(1947).

See Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 HARV. L. REv.

1324 (1958).
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v. Nelson,2 9 for example, has still not abated. But so far as revision of the Smith
Act is concerned, there has been none. In the interim the Court has been the
subject of violent abuse by Congressmen whose actions are not calculated to
help the Courtperform its function. Similarly, Congressional phillippics about
the School SegregationCases have filled volumes of the CongressionalRecord.
But, for these orators, words speak louder than actions.
It is not only the multiple-voiced Congress that has created inappropriate
problems for the Court. One of the burdens which Congress has wilfully or
ignorantly imposed on the Court from time to time is the delegation to it of
legislative functions. Such confusion of function is not calculated to help the
Court to assume its proper role in American government. It has been justified
by two scholars whom I greatly respect. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said:30
"[G]overnment sometimes solves problems by shelving them temporarily. The
legislative process reflects that attitude. Statutes as well as constitutional provisions at times embody purposeful ambiguity or are expressed with a generality
for future unfolding." And in a more concrete situation, Professor Meltzer
has said of the failure of Congress to allocate power between the states and
the nation in the field of labor regulation: 3' "It may be that, despite the defects
of the judicial process, the issues of federalism in labor relations must be left
to the Court because they are 'too complex for legislative determination or
compromise." I cannot agree, however, that issues "too complex for legislative
determination or compromise" are properly dumped on 'the Court for resolution. I submit that Congress cannot at one and the same time say to the Court:
"You decide these questions of policy which are too difficult, or politically too
hot, for us to handle" and then say that the Court should stay out of the legislative area. By imposing this political function of legislation on the Court, it does
a disservice to the Court and to the country.
4. The Court. Perhaps the most delinquent of all, however, in creating
confusion about its role is the Court itself. This is a theme worthy of a book,
which I hope some day to write, but here I want to touch on just three points.
Underlying them all is the fact that the Court suffers from a form of institutional schizophrenia.
First, there is a basic conflict of philosophy within the Court. Some justices
believe that their function is to utilize the power at hand for the accomplishment of those ends of "social justice" which they conceive to be appropriate.
This is not a novel theory of judicial power. Most of you are probably conversant with it as it was exercised by Mr. Justice McReynolds and company in
2350 U.S. 497 (1956). See Cramton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson: A Case Study in Federal
OF CHI. L. Rev. 85 (1958).
Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 27 at 7.
He went on to say:
"Certainly the lack of federalist sophistication in the Taft-Hartley Congress and the
subsequent legislative paralysis support such a judgment. But a decade of litigation and
debate have at least identified the principal issues at stake. The issues are ripe for Congressional determination. Specific Congressional solutions may turn out to be 'unwise'
or inept. But they would at least be wise to the extent that they would reflect a healthy
tradition under which political decisions are made and changed by avowedly political
agencies." Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations, 8 U. OF CH. LAw SCHOOL RECORD (Supp.) 95, 125 (December, 1958).

Pre-Emption, 26 U.
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earlier years of this century. 32 It is hard to distinguish between the judicial and
legislative functions on the basis of this activist philosophy. The current activist
theme has been described by Professor Schlesinger in this way: "The Court
cannot escape politics: therefore, let it use its political power for wholesome
social purposes. Conservative majorities in past Courts have always legislated
in the interests of the business community; why should a liberal majority tie
its hands by a policy of self-denial . . . ?" 33 The activists will tell you that
absolute detachment is impossible of achievement therefore it ought not to
be strived for.
The second face of the Supreme Court says that the Court's function is not
the promulgation of its own notions but rather, in statutory cases, it is the
"proliferation of the purpose of Congress," in Constitutional matters, it is to
sustain the powers of the responsible branches of government except where
the exercise of such powers patently infringes on Constitutionally guaranteed
4
rights or privileges. This view was expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson this way:
"My philosophy has been and continues to be that such an institution, functioning by such methods, cannot and should not try to seize the initiative in
shaping the policy of the law, either by constitutional interpretation or by
statutory construction. While the line to be drawn between interpretation
and legislation is difficult and numerous dissents turn upon it, there is a limit
beyond which the Court incurs the just charge of trying to supersede the lawmaking branches." And in response to the notion that judges are not capable
of detachment, this group says:3 5
For judges, it is not merely a desirable capacity "to emancipate their
purposes" from their private desires; it is their duty. It is a cynical belief
in too many quarters, though I believe this cult of cynicism is receding, that
it is at best a self-delusion for judges to profess to pursue disinterestedness.
It is asked with sophomoric brightness, does a man cease to be himself when
he becomes a Justice? Does he change his character by putting on a gown?
No, he does not change his character. He brings his whole experience, his
training, his outlook, his social, intellectual and moral environment with
him when he takes a seat on the supreme bench. But a judge worth his salt
is in the grip of his functions. The intellectual habits of self-discipline
which govern his mind are as much a part of him as the influences of the
interests he may have represented at the bar, often much more so.
Certainly one will understand the role of the Court differently according to
whether its function is defined in activist terms or in terms of judicial restraint
and majorities of the Court continue to wobble between the two.
There is a second manner in which the Court prevents an appropriate
understanding of its function. Since it speaks with several voices in its official
capacity and speaks not at all in its unofficial capacity, at least as to the business
before it, the only way to secure an idea of the reasons and factors which caused
the Court to reach a given judgment is by reading its opinions. But recently
we have had too many opinions which obfuscate rather than enlighten. "The
' See 2 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, chs. 40-41 (1932): Jackson, THE STRUGGLE
FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
Schlesinger, The Supreme Court: 1947, 35 FORTUNE 73, 202 (January, 1947).
,Jackson, op. cit. supra note 8 at 79-80.
Frankfurter, J., quoted in 3 WISDOM 26 (January, 1959).
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Court's product has shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic
statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to
support them in reason, in sum, of opinions -thatdo not opine and of per curiam
orders that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the authorities they
cite and the results they decree." 30 Holmes told us long ago that "general
propositions do not decide concrete cases." 3 7 Some members of the Court
apparently believe otherwise. Not only are "general propositions" used to resolve the case before the Court, they are used as proclamations of doctrine
irrelevant to the case before it but perhaps applicable to other cases which
might arise in the future. Once again we have the confusion of the judicial
and legislative functions inherent in the activist philosophy. Professor Freund
says, in his characteristically kindly way, that this "represents a tendency toward over-broadness that is not an augury of enduring work and that misses
the opportunity to use the litigation process for the refinement and adaptation
of principle to meet the variety of concrete issues as they are presented in a
lawsuit." 38 For a prime example of the manner in which the Court may confound rather than reveal -the bases for its decision, while at the same time
issuing edicts on all sorts of matters not before the Court, I refer you to the
opinion of the Chief Justice, speaking for four members of the Court, in Sweezy
v. New Hampshire,3" one of the cases singled out by the Conference of Chief
Justices for condemnation.
A third difficulty created by the Court in explaining its appropriate function is revealed by the conflict between those Justices who think its job is to
consider only those cases involving federal questions of major importance to
the country and those of its members who regard themselves as sitting as a
court of errors and appeals. Certainly one of the burdens from which the
Court suffers is the amount of work which it must handle each year. It must
pass upon two thousand applications to be heard and from one hundred to one
hundred and fifty cases on the merits. Any time it devotes to matters which
are of importance only to the immedate litigants means less time available to
deal with those issues which are of great importance to the Country. And yet,
Term after Term, the Court must turn to analysis of questions relating solely
to the weight of the evidence or similarly isolated matters because four members of the Court have voted to bring such cases before the entire tribunal for
consideration.
It is because of these -three internal conflicts that I think the Court prevents
a general understanding of its proper function.
Having imposed on you to this extent, I seek your indulgence for a few more
minutes to explain why I concur in the view of the Chief Justices that the
Court should abandon its activist role. I have three reasons.
First, I think judical activism should be rejected because it replaces a representative legislature with a group which is neither representative nor re"Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Power: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HRv.L. REv. 1, 3 (1957).
'Holmes, J., dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
sFreund, op. cit. supra note 13.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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sponsible to anyone but itself.4- Judicial activism is undemocratic. 41 To the
extent that a check on democracy is necessary, its function should be confined
to those areas in which it is essential. To return once again to the language of
Judge Hand: "Each one of us must in the end choose for himself how far he
would like to leave our collective fate to the wayward vagaries of popular assemblies.... For myself it would be irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." 42
Second, judicial activism should be rejected because it undermines the
public faith in the objectivity and detachment of the Court, without which the
Court will be reduced to an impotent body, unable to perform those important,
indeed vital functions which properly fall within its scope. As long ago as de
Tocqueville, it was recognized that the Court's "power is enormous, but it is
the power of public opinion. [It is] all powerful so long as the people respect
the law; but [it] would be impotent against popular neglect or contempt for
the law." 43 At this time when the Court is being called upon so frequently for
the protection of minority and individual rights against the claims of the state
and society, its power to command popular support is reduced to a minimum.
Unable to sustain its authority through the approval of its judgments, its basic
claim to support must rest on the understanding of the people "that the Supreme Court, whatever its defects, is still the most detached, dispassionate, and
trustworthy custodian that our system [can offer] for the translation of abstract into concrete constitutional commands." 44
Finally, I suggest that judicial activism should be rejected because the exercise of such naked power invites a reply in kind from those on whose domain
the Court is poaching. And in a pitched battle between Congress and the
Court, Congress is endowed with the stronger weapons: the jurisdiction and
membership of the Court are at its mercy. Shorn of its shield of judicial objectivity, in a day when its opinions are not likely to be popular, it has no adequate defense against such potential legislative attack, the reality of which is
all too patent in the Bills which have been introduced in Congress.
Professor Freund has aptly said that: "To understand the United States
Supreme Court is a theme that forces lawyers to become philosophers." 45
While this may be an onerous burden to place upon us, I can only say that it
is one which we must all assume. And, in the course of doing so, perhaps we
can examine the work of the Court's critics with more detachment and less
emotion than has been afforded the efforts of the Conference of Chief Justices.
We may still find many things in their Report and Resolution with which we
will disagree. But disagreement on the merits is a lot more useful than the
purely visceral response which they have heretofore called forth.
4
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